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his Essay will focus on whether or not recent regulatory takings
cases undo what was done in Penn Central TransportationCo. v.
New York City,' and specifically whether the designation of property
as a historic landmark can violate the Takings Clause.2 Indeed, this is
a live issue; it was not killed by Penn Central, and people with real
property continue to challenge such designations. For example, Eunice Shriver-Kennedy recently sued the town of Palm Beach to prevent its landmarks preservation commission from designating the
Kennedys' Palm Beach estate a historic landmark.' Thus, this case is
evidence that historic designation of property can, and in fact does,
give rise to claims of unconstitutional takings.
The takings issue has perplexed many a court, including the
Supreme Court when it decided Penn Central. In that case, the Court
did not hold that historic designz:tion could never violate the Fifth
Amendment. Rather, Penn Central essentially stands for two points:
(1) the designation of Grand Central Station in New York City was
not an unconstitutional taking, and (2) New York's law of historic
designation, as applied to that case, was a legitimate exercise of the
police power.
Penn Central is cited in every takings case to this day for the notion
that a fact-based inquiry is the most essential key to understanding
each particular takings case. I remind you of Justice Brennan's famous quote, "this Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any
'set formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that
economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than disproportionately concentrated on a few
persons." 4
More recently, the issue presented in Penn Centralwas faced by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in United Artists' Theater Circuit,Inc. v.
5 The facts of the two cases were essentially simiCity of Philadelphia.
lar. The Boyd Theater was designated a historic landmark by the Philadelphia Historical Commission.6 The designation required the
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2. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. Jon Glass, Rose Kennedy Sues to Keep Mansion. Off Landmark List, PALM
BEACH POST, Jan. 21, 1995, at Al.
4. Penn Central,438 U.S. at 124.

5. 595 A.2d 6 (Pa. 1991), rev'd on reh'g, 635 A.2d 612 (Pa. 1993).
6. United Artists', 595 A.2d at 7.
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owners of the theater to preserve both the interior and the exterior of
the building at their own expense, under threat of criminal penalty.7
The owners challenged the designation under the takings clause of the
Pennsylvania Constitution.8 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
heard the case twice.
In 1991, when it first heard the case, the court decided that the
designation was an unconstitutional application of the city's historic
preservation program. 9 As a result of that decision, the phones were
flooded. The Pennsylvania Attorney General called the court. The
National Trust for Historic Preservation responded vociferously, of
course, as did a number of other persons and organizations, including
state representatives. Eventually, the court agreed to rehear the case.
Two years later, the court reversed itself, finding that the Philadelphia ordinance was not unconstitutional. 10 However, it side-stepped
the takings issue, holding only that the legislature had exceeded its
authority by regulating not only the exterior but also the interior of
the building."
Therefore, the Boyd Theater case came close to bucking Penn Central directly. Note, however, that the court was careful to point out
that "[t]here may be circumstances inwhich the mere designation of
property as historic would constitute a taking due to the extreme financial hardship resulting from such designation."' 2
Since Penn Central,there have been several other important takings
decisions in addition to the Boyd Theater decision. First, Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council 3 stands for the proposition that if a
government regulation deprives a private property owner of all economically beneficial use of his or her property, the property owner is
entitled to compensation from the government.1 4 Second, according
to the analysis in Nollan v. CaliforniaCoastal Commission'5 and Dolan v. City of Tigard,16 a governmental regulation must substantially
advance a legitimate state interest to refute a property owner's claim
for just compensation under the Takings Clause.
Of course, Lucas did not address whether a private property owner
is entitled to compensation when government regulation affects less
7. Id. at 11 (citing PHILADELPHIA, PA., PHILADELPHIA CODE, § 14-2007(1)-(8)
(1989) (Philadelphia Historic Buildings, Structures, Sites, Objects, and Districts
Ordinance)).
8. PA. CONST. art. I, § 10.
9. United Artists', 595 A.2d at 6. The court avoided confronting Penn Centralas
contrary precedent by deciding the case under the takings clause of the Pennsylvania
Constitution rather than its counterpart in the United States Constitution.
10. United Artists', 635 A.2d at 612, 620.
11. Id at 621.
12. Id at 618-19 n.3.
13. 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992).
14. Id. at 2900.
15. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
16. 114 S.Ct. 2309 (1994).
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than an entire parcel of real estate. However, whether compensation
is constitutionally required for such "partial takings" was the focus of
Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States,'17 which has been discussed at length elsewhere in this issue. 8
Given the state of Fifth Amendment regulatory takings jurisprudence, the door is open for takings challenges to regulatory schemes
like those considered in Lucas, Nollan, and Dolan. There is no principled distinction between historic preservation laws and the environmental or land-use regulations that were invalidated in these cases.
In summary, one should begin the evaluation of a takings claim with
the realization that even under the Supreme Court's Penn Central
analysis, it is possible that a historic preservation ordinance could effect an unconstitutional taking. Furthermore, under Lucas, if a
landmark designation deprives a property owner of all economically
beneficial use of that individual's property, there has been a compensable taking. Finally, under Nollan and Dolan, a permit condition, related to a landmark designation, that does not substantially advance a
legitimate state interest, will require compensation to a claimant.
In closing, I would like to point out that when one considers the
legitimacy of historic designation, the easy cases are Mount Vernon,
or Monticello, or buildings that were designed by very prominent architects. However, these are typically not the type of historic preservation cases that the judiciary faces. In most cases, the questions
being posed involve designations of buildings or landmarks of, at best,
minimal "historic value." But these designations impose the kind of
obligations on private property owners that the Supreme Court has
held to violate the Takings Clause. Thus, when a private property
owner is forced to bear a burden that "in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole"' 9 because of the historic
designation of his or her property, that individual may seek just compensation for an unconstitutional taking.

17. 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995).
18. The FloridaRock decision is discussed at greater length in many of the Articles published in the section of this book on Takings and Our Federal Foundational
Environmental Statutes.
19. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).

